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HIGH STAKES: THROWING A HAIL MARY TO
CONGRESS FOR A FEDERAL BAN ON SPORTS BETTING
IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
Kaitlyn Kallert*
Our games embody our very finest traditions and values. They stand
for clean healthy competition. They stand for teamwork. And they
stand for success through preparation and honest effort. With
legalized sports gambling, our games instead will come to represent
the fast buck, the quick fix, the desire to get something for nothing.
The spread of legalized sports gambling would change forever—and
for the worse—what our games stand for and the way they are
perceived.
- Paul Tagliabue, Commissioner of the National Football League
1
INTRODUCTION
Sports, both professional and amateur, are considered America’s
pastime and have become an integral part of Americans’ daily lives.
Research has shown that sixty-seven percent of American adults
follow at least one sport, whether it be by attending games, watching
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2020; B.A. in Criminal Justice, Rider
University, 2017. I would like to thank my parents whose endless love, support
and guidance have allowed me to pursue my dreams without limitation. I would
also like to thank my roommates for their encouragement and for being my family
these past three years. Lastly, I would like to thank the entire Journal of Law and
Policy staff, especially Elizabeth, Gabriella and Rachel for their invaluable
feedback, patience and support during this tedious process.
1
ERNEST P. GOSS & EDWARD V. MORSE, GOVERNING FORTUNE: CASINO
GAMBLING INAMERICA 154 (2007).
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on television or simply checking the box scores.
2
Whether we are
fans or not, sports are everywhere we look, from radio conversation
and television programming to newspapers, online advertisements
and water cooler talk. Of those who consider themselves fans, many
use the world of sports as a distraction from the humdrum of
everyday life.
3
Americans develop deep connections with both
sports teams and franchises, becoming loyally invested in their
successes and failures.
4
But with the soaring growth of professional
sports has come an undeniable surge in sports betting and
gambling.
5
The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision overruling a federal
prohibition on sports betting as unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment has cleared the way for states to legalize sports
gambling, which, in turn, has proven a controversial subject.
6
Supporters of state legalization of sports gambling
7
“argue that
2
Stephen Weinstein, The Stakes Are High: The Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act is Constitutionally Vulnerable and Reflects Bad Policy, 33
TOURO L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2018).
3
Cole Bollinger, Sports Offer the Best Distraction of All, THE MANEATER,
(Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.themaneater.com/stories/sports/sports-offer-best-
distraction-all.
4
See, e.g., Terry Lefton, What Drives Team Loyalty?, SPORTS BUS. DAILY
(Oct. 12, 2015),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/10/12/In-Depth/Fan-
study.aspx (analyzing 4,000 sports fans in the U.S. to determine their loyalty to
several pro sports—the National Hockey League, Major League Baseball,
National Football League (“NFL”) and the National Basketball Association
(“NBA”)); Jerry Useem, The Curse of the Loyal Sports Fan, THE ATLANTIC
(July/Aug. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/07/the-
curse-of-the-loyal-sports-fan/485594/ (noting that Chicago Cubs fans “are too
loyal”).
5
The United States has the fastest growing sports betting market. “In 2009
the U.S. sports betting market was valued at $20 billion. By 2016, it was valued
at $40 billion. With a present market capitalization of (conservatively) between
$60–73 billion, the market has conservatively grown at a rate of $10 billion per
year.” Aaron Gray, The Size and Increase of the Global Sports Betting Market,
SPORTS BETTING DIME (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.sportsbettingdime.com/guides/finance/global-sports-betting-
market/.
6
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85
(2018).
7
The terms “sports betting” and “sports gambling” are used interchangeably
throughout this Note.
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legalization will generate revenue for states and critically weaken
illegal sports betting operations, which are often commissioned by
organized crime.”
8
However, as the Supreme Court notes,
opponents contend that the legalization of sports betting will expose
America’s youth to accessible gambling, “encourage people of
modest means to squander their savings, and corrupt both
professional and college sports.”
9
While gambling in any sports
league provides opportunities for scandal and corruption,
10
Congress should take action to ban gambling in collegiate and other
amateur sports in particular, as these contexts pose a heightened risk
for corruption predicated on the athletes’ youthfulness and
vulnerability. We should not gamble with the integrity of our
colleges or the futures of our college athletes. Our young athletes
deserve legal protection from the seedy influences of gambling, and
fans deserve to know that athletic competitions are honest and fair.
Part I of this Note will detail the history of sports betting in the
United States predating the passage of the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act in 1992. Part II will discuss PASPA
11
and its
relevant background, including Congress’ intent to protect players
and the general public from the risk and corruption that accompanies
sports wagering. Part III will examine the United States Supreme
Court and lower courts’ decisions inMurphy v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, ultimately overruling a federal prohibition on
sports gambling, and will discuss the implications of this ruling on
state legislation moving forward. Part IV will examine the dangers
8
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484.
9
Id.
10
Chris Chase, 11 Biggest Scandals in Sports Gambling History, USA
TODAY (May 16, 2018, 7:31 AM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2018/05/11-biggest-
scandals-in-sports-gambling-history (describing some of the most notable
instances of scandal and corruption in sports which include the 1951 scandal
involving thirty-two college basketball players from seven schools around the
country who participated in a mafia-run point-shaving scheme. Subsequently, it
was revealed that members of the Lucchese crime family were involved in another
point-shaving scandal involving the basketball team at Boston College. In an
additional instance, John “Hot Rod” Williams, an NBA veteran, faced jail time
stemming from a 1985 point-shaving scandal at Tulane University. The scandal
involved five players who were accused of shaving points in two games for a total
of $17,000.).
11
PASPA refers to the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act.
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of legalized sports betting, particularly within the realm of collegiate
athletics. Finally, Part V will offer a proposition that the United
States Congress act to implement federal legislation regulating
sports betting and outlawing all sports gambling on amateur sports.
I. HISTORY OF SPORTSBETTING INAMERICA PRECEDING THE
PROFESSIONAL ANDAMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTIONACT
Dating back to eighteenth-century sports culture in America,
when a competition occurred in which one party would prevail,
individuals followed with ripe wallets, an eagerness to gamble and
a hope to profit off their bets.
12
Sports gambling first emerged in the
United States when an activity referred to as “pedestrianism,” a form
of race-walking popular in England, made its way across the
Atlantic Ocean.
13
Pedestrianism quickly gained popularity in
America, and people became invested in gambling on the races’
outcomes. Following the popularization of gambling on
pedestrianism, Americans wasted no time finding other activities on
which to place their bets, including “horse racing, cockfighting and
bare-knuckle brawls.”
14
For much of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth
century many types of gambling continued to popularize
immensely, and with that, sports gambling in particular paralleled in
exponential growth.
15
Americans increasingly turned their interest
to team sports that were quickly emerging and gaining popularity.
16
Sports betting became steadily more prominent with the rise of
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) in 1871.
17
The mounting
popularity of professional sports at this time coined what became
12
Brett Smiley, A History of Sports Betting in the United States: Gambling
Laws and Outlaws, SPORTS HANDLE (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://sportshandle.com/gambling-laws-legislation-united-states-history/.
13
Christopher Polisano, Betting Against PASPA: Why the Federal
Restrictions on Sports Gambling are Unconstitutional and How They Hurt the
States, 25 JEFFERY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 453, 455–56 (2018).
14
Id. at 456.
15
Chil Woo, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZOARTS&ENT L.J. 569, 572 (2013).
16
Polisano, supra note 13.
17
Woo, supra note 15.
280 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
known as the “golden age of sports.”
18
The attractiveness of sports
gambling was further exacerbated by the emergence of televised
sporting events in 1939, as spectators and fans could now watch the
games live and observe the results of their wagers in real time.
19
Americans immediately acknowledged the opportunity to turn
sports into a money-making entity.
20
However, the lack of
regulation of sports gambling led to a world of underground
gambling in the form of “bookies”
21
and syndicate bookmakers,
22
and the rise in the popularity of sports gambling was followed by
high-profile gambling scandals.
23
As professional baseball captured the nation’s attention, it
provided a particularly attractive and opportune space for illegal
sports betting activity such as point-shaving and match-fixing.
24
This betting activity, which eventually led to corruption in the realm
of professional sports, caused the public perception of sports to turn
sour, leaving behind, at least in part, the feeling of a game that was
18
Polisano, supra note 13.
19
Neil H. Huffey, College Sports Wagering: A Case Study About Gambling
on College Athletics and the Motivations and Consequences Surrounding
Legislation Wanting to Ban Wagering on College Sports, 415 UNLV THESES,
DISSERTATIONS, PROF. PAPERS, & CAPSTONES 16, 17 (2001).
20
Michael Goodwin, The College Sports Industry; When the Cash Register
is the Scoreboard, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1986, at 1.
21
“Bookie” is a slang term for a bookmaker. The job of a bookmaker is to
accept and pay off bets from gamblers. The wagers are usually on sporting events,
but bookies also accept bets on horse racing and casino games. Gambling Insights
101, ACE PER HEAD, https://www.aceperhead.com/blog/2018/02/18/gambling-
insights-101/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). Richard Johnson, The Centuries-Old
History of How Sports Betting Became Illegal in the United States, SBNATION
(May 18, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.sbnation.com/2018/5/18/17353994/sports-betting-illegal-united-
states-why (describing the world of American sports gambling at the turn of the
century); see alsoDavid Purdum, Sports Betting Legalization: HowWe Got Here,
ESPN (May 21, 2018), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/23561576/chalk-
line-how-got-legalized-sports-betting (describing “a thriving black market” in
sports betting during the Prohibition era).
22
Huffey, supra note 19, at 19; Steve Cady, The Bookie and the Syndicates,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1970, at 164.
23
Justin Fielkow et al., Tackling PASPA: The Past, Present, and Future of
Sports Gambling in America, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 26 (2016).
24
Id. at 23, 26, 29.
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once relatively innocent and grounded in chance.
25
The negative
stigma surrounding sports betting was further exacerbated by the
Black Sox scandal, remembered now as the most infamous match-
fixing scandal in American history.
26
Several players from the 1919
Chicago White Sox team,
27
considered to be one of the greatest
teams in the history of professional baseball,
28
carried out a plan to
fix theWorld Series in exchange for a monetary bribe from gamblers
associated with organized crime.
29
Notorious gangster Arnold
Rothstein offered to pay eight members of the White Sox team
$10,000 each to intentionally lose the game against the Cincinnati
Reds.
30
The scandal came to light, and as a result, those eight White
Sox players were banned from professional baseball indefinitely.
31
The Black Sox scandal of 1919 drastically altered the public’s
perception of sports gambling and sports generally, as it occurred at
a time when the notoriety of the World Series was at its historical
peak prominence.
32
A subsequent scandal involving professional baseball icon Pete
Rose further dragged down the public’s perception of the legitimacy
of sports.
33
Rose was a MLB team manager who was banned from
25
Id. at 26.
26
See generally CHARLES RIVER EDITORS, THE BLACK SOX SCANDAL: THE
HISTORY AND LEGACY OF AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS SPORTS
CONTROVERSY (2015) (detailing how the Chicago White Sox fixed the World
Series as a gambling scheme and became the most infamous culprits of game
fixing to date).
27
Fred Mitchell, Flashback: Story of 1919 Black Sox Scandal Still
Resonates, CHI. TRIBUNE (July 5, 2015),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/white-sox/ct-flashback-buck-weaver-
black-sox-spt-0705-20150703-story.html (naming the eight players banned from
baseball as Ed Cicotte, Joe Jackson, Oscar Emil Felsch, Arnold Gandil, Frederick
William McMullin, Charles August Risberg, George Daniel Weaver and Claude
Preston Williams).
28
Id.
29
Fielkow et al., supra note 23, at 26.
30
Matthew T. Mierswa, Poor Man Wanna Be Rich, Rich Man Wanna Be
King: The Battle to Legalize Sports Betting in the Garden State, 38 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 447, 470 (2014).
31
Polisano, supra note 13, at 458.
32
Mierswa, supra note 30, at 470.
33
Chase, supra note 10.
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the sport when he was found to be betting on professional baseball
games in which he was personally involved as a manager.
34
The
scandal cost Rose not only a lucrative baseball career, but also the
possibility of someday becoming a Baseball Hall of Fame
inductee.
35
Following the highly publicized and notorious Peter
Rose incident, Rose fans became disenchanted with him and his
scandalous activities.
36
Fans and spectators started viewing sporting
events with skepticism and apprehension in the years that followed,
and the question of whether players, coaches and officials were
being influenced by profitable criminal side hustles became a lasting
issue.
37
34
Polisano, supra note 13, at 458; Gerald Posner, “Say it Ain’t So Pete!”
How Did Pete Rose’s Obsessions Bring Him Tumbling From the Pinnacle of
Baseball?, PENTHOUSE (1999), http://geraldposner.blogspot.com/2016/01/say-it-
aint-so-pete-how-did-pete-roses.html. Responding to the scandal involving Rose,
notable sports journalist Gerald Posner commented:
[T]he possibility exists that decisions won’t be made in the
team’s best interest, but rather because of the money riding on
the game. If a manager bets on a game, he may bring a player
off injured reserve sooner that he should in order to win, or he
may pitch a reliever without enough rest, not caring that he
won’t be able to pitch for several extra days. If a betting
manager gets in large debt to bookies, he can clear his account
by merely revealing inside information about the team. The
opportunity for corruption is greatly increased. This is not to
suggest that Rose compromised [his team] in any way. The
chance that such impropriety could result is the reason for such
a strict taboo on betting baseball.
Id.
35
Jeff Merron, Biggest Sports Gambling Scandals, ESPN (Feb. 7, 2006),
http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=merron/060207.
36
See generally Josh Hening, Pete Rose and Phillies: The Illusion of
Morality in Sports, 97.3 ESPN (Aug. 2, 2017), https://973espn.com/pete-rose-
and-phillies-the-illusion-of-morality-in-sports/ (explaining that many baseball
fans were conflicted in their feelings towards Rose, as he had such a high level of
success on the field but such a low level of morality off the field).
37
See generally Wendell Barnhouse, Maintaining Integrity of the Games
Will be Ongoing Issue for NCAA with Legalized Sports Betting, GLOBAL SPORT
MATTERS (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://globalsportmatters.com/business/2018/08/31/integrity-ncaa-legalized-
sports-betting/.
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II. ENACTING THE PROFESSIONAL ANDAMATEUR SPORTS
PROTECTIONACT
In response to public concern about gambling’s effects on the
legitimacy of professional and amateur sports, as well as pressure
from professional and amateur sports organizations, Congress
enacted the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(“PASPA”) in 1992.
38
Legislators intended PASPA to “[serve] an
important public purpose, to stop the spread of State-sponsored
sports gambling and to maintain the integrity of [the] national
pastime.”
39
Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona introduced
PASPA on February 22, 1991.
40
It was later enacted by Congress
and signed into law by President George H. W. Bush on October 28,
1992.
41
The statute prohibited any governmental entity from
sponsoring or sanctioning any form of sports betting.
42
Prior to the
passage of PASPA, states were free to invoke the power granted to
them by the Tenth Amendment and had the discretion to prohibit
38
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991) (discussing the legislative intent of
PASPA and integrating the opinions of professional sports officers).
Sports gambling threatens to change the nature of sporting
events fromwholesome entertainment for all ages to devices for
gambling. It undermines public confidence in the character of
professional and amateur sports . . . [and] will promote
gambling among our Nation’s young people. . . . Governments
should not be in the business of encouraging people, especially
young people, to gamble.
Id.
39
Id. at 4.
40
Mierswa, supra note 30, at 450.
41
Fielkow et al., supra note 23, at 31–32.
42
PASPA states that:
It shall be unlawful for [either] . . . a governmental entity . . . or
a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to
the law or compact of a governmental entity, a lottery,
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme
based, directly or indirectly (through use of geographical
references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in
which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are
intended to participate, or on one or more performances such as
athletes in such games.
28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2017).
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sports gambling.
43
However, PASPA effectively stripped the state
governmental entities of that power and prohibited them from
passing legislation to legalize sports betting.
44
Although PASPA prohibited all governmental entities from
participating in sports gambling, Congress provided for several
exceptions.
45
The Act grandfathered in any state that currently
43
Fielkow et al., supra note 23, at 29 (“Although most states had already
elected to prohibit sports betting prior to enactment of PASPA, Congress, for the
most part, had given states the freedom to regulate sports gambling within their
borders.”).
44
Id. at 32.
45
28 U.S.C. § 3704:
(a) Section 3702 shall not apply to—
(1) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme in operation in a State or other governmental
entity, to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that State
or other governmental entity at any time during the period
beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990;(2) a
lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering
scheme in operation in a State or other governmental entity
where both—
(A) such scheme was authorized by a statute as in effect on
October 2, 1991; and
(B) a scheme described in section 3702 (other than one
based on pari-mutuel animal racing or jai-alai games)
actually was conducted in that State or other governmental
entity at any time during the period beginning September
1, 1989, and ending October 2, 1991, pursuant to the law
of that State or other governmental entity; [The above
exceptions applied to the four states grandfathered in,
namely Delaware, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon. The
exception below under (3) is the one that allowed New
Jersey to consider being the fifth state to survive the new
restrictive regulatory scheme after January 1, 1993.] (3) a
betting, gambling, or wagering scheme, other than a lottery
described in paragraph (1), conducted exclusively in
casinos located in a municipality, but only to the extent
that—(A) such scheme or a similar scheme was authorized,
not later than one year after the effective date of this
chapter, to be operated in that municipality; and (B) any
commercial casino gaming scheme was in operation in
such municipality throughout the 10-year period ending on
such effective date pursuant to a comprehensive system of
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permitted or operated a sports betting system at any time between
1976 and 1990.
46
Thus, subsequent to the enactment of PASPA,
Oregon, Delaware, Montana and Nevada were the only states
permitted to operate legalized sports betting as these states had
implemented a sports betting scheme during the allotted period of
time.
47
Additionally, Congress added a stipulation that allowed a
state to implement a legalized sports betting system by January 1,
1993, one year after PASPA took effect, with the restriction that the
state must have had continually-operated casino gambling for at
least the ten years prior to the enactment date.
48
This exception
provided an exemption for states such as New Jersey, which was
already operating casino gambling in Atlantic City.
49
However, New
Jersey failed to implement a sports betting system within the allotted
time PASPA granted.
50
Therefore, Delaware, Montana, Nevada and
Oregon remained the only states exempt from PASPA’s sports
betting prohibition.
51
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report
recommending the passage of PASPA, the Act’s express purpose
was to “prohibit sports gambling conducted by, or authorized under
the law of, any State or other governmental entity.”
52
PASPA was
also referred to as the Bradley Act, named after former professional
basketball player and then-New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley, who
State regulation authorized by that State’s constitution and
applicable solely to such municipality; or (4) pari-mutuel
animal racing or jai-alai games.
28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2017).
46
Fielkow et al., supra note 23, at 32.
47
Polisano, supra note 13, at 461.
48
Id.
49
Although the provision did not specifically mention New Jersey or
Atlantic City, its requirements—permitting legalization only “in a municipality”
with an uninterrupted 10-year history of legalized casino gaming—did not fit
anyplace else. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1465
(2018) (“[PASPA] permitted New Jersey to set up a sports gambling scheme in
Atlantic City within a year of [its] enactment.”). See generally 28 U.S.C. §
3704(a)(3)(B) (2017) (excusing any commercial casino gaming scheme that was
in operation, in a municipality, throughout a ten-year period).
50
Polisano, supra note 13, at 461.
51
Id.
52
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 (1991).
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acted as the bill’s driving force.
53
Senator Bradley believed that “the
harm that state-sponsored sports betting cause[d] far outweigh[ed]
the financial advantages received,” such as tax revenue.
54
During the
bill’s congressional hearing, Bradley recounted a first-hand account
he witnessed that displayed sports betting’s effect of replacing
passion for the game with passion for the bets: he told an account of
fans cheering for the game-ending shot of a seemingly irrelevant
basketball game simply because of the impact the shot’s outcome
had on the point spread and, thus, on gamblers’ winnings and
losses.
55
Bradley most notably advocated for athletes and protested
against them being likened to roulette chips or pawns in a money-
making entity.
56
The legislative records of PASPA indicate that its
53
Nina Totenberg, New Jersey Takes on Major Professional Sports Leagues
in Sports Betting Case, NPR (Dec. 3, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/12/03/567282814/new-jersey-takes-on-major-
professional-sports-leagues-in-sports-betting-case%00. Senator Bill Bradley
proffered that:
Athletes are not roulette chips, but sports gambling treats them
as such. If the dangers of state sponsored sports betting are not
confronted, the characters of sports and youngsters’ view of
them could be seriously threatened . . . . Just as legalizing drugs
would lead to increased drug addiction, legalizing sports
gambling would aggravate the problems associated with
gambling. As a society, we cannot afford this result,
[and] . . . [l]egalizing sports gambling would encourage young
people to participate in sports to win money. They would no
longer love the game for the purity of the experience.
Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act-Policy
Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETONHALL J. SPORT L. 5, 5–7 (1992).
54
Bradley, supra note 53, at 8.
55
“Bradley’s contention that he had witnessed fans cheering a seemingly
irrelevant NBA end of game shot that resulted in a team covering the spread was
not confirmed or pinpointed to a particular game by Bradley himself.” Ryan M.
Rodenberg & Anastasios Kaburakis, Legal and Corruption Issues in Sports
Gambling, 23 J. LEGALASPECTS SPORT 1, 17 n.86 (2013).
56
See Bradley, supra note 53, at 5–7.
Sports gambling threatens the character of team sports. Our
games embody our very finest traditions and values. They stand
for clean, healthy competition. They stand for teamwork. And
they stand for success through preparation and honest effort.
With legalized sports gambling, our games instead will come to
represent the fast buck, the quick fix, the desire to get something
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supporters believed that any expansion of sports gambling,
including state-sponsored sports gambling, would increase the
chances of corruption and completely deplete the public trust in
professional and amateur sports.
57
PASPA sought to achieve three
goals: (1) to restrict any further growth of state-sponsored sports
betting; (2) to maintain the integrity of sports; and (3) to protect the
youth of America from the dangers of gambling and vice.
58
This
Note is primarily concerned with the former two goals and with
Congress’ finding that sports wagering “undermines public
confidence in the character of professional and amateur sports” as a
leading motivation behind the passage of PASPA.
59
In addition to the support from Congress, PASPA was also
supported by the Commissioners of multiple professional sports
leagues including Francis T. “Fay” Vincent of MLB, David Stern of
the National Basketball Association and Paul Tagliabue of the
National Football League.
60
Proponents of PASPA reasoned that
Congress’ restriction on states’ authorization of legalized sports
gambling would greatly limit the possibility and opportunity for
corruption in sports.
61
The Commissioners’ main concern was
maintaining the fairness and integrity of their sports and keeping
them free from corruption.
62
PASPA gave rise to multiple lawsuits challenging the Act’s
constitutionality brought largely by private citizens and eventually
by a state government.
63
For example, in Flagler v. U.S. Attorney
for the District of New Jersey,
64
the claimant, a private citizen of the
state of New Jersey, argued that PASPA violated the Tenth
for nothing. The spread of legalized sports gambling would
change forever—and for the worse—what our games stand for
and the way they are perceived.
GOSS&MORSE, supra note 1.
57
See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991).
58
Id. at 4.
59
Id. at 5.
60
Woo, supra note 15, at 575.
61
Id. at 576.
62
Id.
63
See infra notes 64, 102, 109.
64
Flagler v. U.S. Att’y Dist. of N.J., No. 06-3699 (JAG), 2007WL 2814657,
at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2007).
288 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Amendment of the United States Constitution and that a right to
gamble was infringed.
65
The claimant also raised the argument that
sports gambling was “contained within a state’s borders and,
therefore, should not be subject to federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause.”
66
The district court reasoned that not only did
the plaintiff have no legally protected right to gamble, but also that
even if the court were to overturn PASPA, New Jersey would be
highly unlikely to pass any kind of sports betting regulation as the
State did not do so before the implementation of PASPA, or during
the one-year window PASPA allowed.
67
Thus, the district court
concluded that since there was no injury in fact to the claimant’s
legally protected interests, the claimant lacked constitutional and
prudential standing to challenge the statute and dismissed the suit.
68
The rise of the Internet, which boomed shortly following
PASPA’s enactment, revolutionized the sports gambling industry.
69
In the years preceding the widespread adoption of the Internet, those
who wanted to place bets on sporting events were limited to two
options—legal wagering in Nevada
70
and illegal wagering with a
local bookie.
71
Years later, the Internet became largely responsible
for removing the geographical constraints on sports gambling.
72
People could now wage their bets from the privacy of their own
homes using their personal computers. The increased accessibility
65
See Erica N. Reib, Ante Up or Fold: What Should Be Done About
Gambling in College Sports?, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 621, 627 (2011) (“The
Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not delegated to the United States or
prohibited to the States by the Constitution to the States or the people.”).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Flager, 2017 WL 2814657, at *3–5.
69
George Diemer & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Economics of Online Sports
Gambling, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS
GAMBLING 131 (2012).
70
Id. at 132.
71
Id. at 133.
72
Gary Mills, Five Things That the Internet Changed in the Sports Betting
Industry, GAMBLINGSITES.COM (Jan. 21, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://www.gamblingsites.com/blog/five-things-that-the-internet-changed-in-
the-sports-betting-industry-91665/amp/.
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of sports gambling online subverted the intent and efficacy of
PASPA while underscoring the need for federal regulation.
73
In an attempt to further regulate sports gambling by targeting
that which occurred online and undermined the intent of PASPA,
Congress introduced H.R. 3125, otherwise known as the “Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000.”
74
The bill was introduced in an
attempt to ban all Internet gambling, as its advocates believed the
Internet introduced new and challenging issues to sports gambling.
75
Gerry Waldron, who represented the NFL during the bill’s
committee hearing, explained the need for updates in our country’s
laws to reflect the new technology’s implications on sports betting.
76
He further reasoned that the Internet provided a gambler with the
means to circumvent the prohibitions set forth in PASPA and the
Wire Act (pre-PASPA legislation banning ports gambling via
telephone).
77
For instance, although no states were enacting
legislation legalizing sports betting due to the restraints of PASPA,
citizens could still utilize the Internet to place bets in states where it
was legal (Delaware, Montana, Nevada and Oregon) as well as in
offshore online sports books.
78
However, the bill was eventually
defeated in the House, largely due to the lobbying efforts of Jack
Abramoff, a notorious and powerful pro-gambling lobbyist.
79
In the
73
See Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The Future of Internet
Gambling, 7 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 29, 31–32 (2000).
74
H.R. 3125. 106th Cong. (1999–2000).
75
Id.
76
Internet Gambling Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 3125 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Gerard J. Waldron,
on behalf of the National Football League).
77
Id. The Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2018), predated the emergence of the
Internet and thereby acted in the limited scope of prohibiting sports gambling via
telephone. Id.
78
Joey Richardson, How the Repeal of the Federal Sports Betting Law
Changes the Way You Can Make Bets, GAMBLINGSITES.NET (June 6, 2018),
https://www.gamblingsites.net/news/how-the-repeal-of-the-federal-sports-
betting-law-changes-the-way-you-can-make-bets-12572/.
79
See generally Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, How a Lobbyist
Stacked the Deck, WASH. POST. (Oct. 16, 2005),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/10/16/how-a-lobbyist-
stacked-the-deck/fadf79ab-ec83-46d5-8061-66aceb21c51b/ (detailing how Jack
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wake of the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act’s defeat, another
similar effort arose through the Amateur Sports Integrity Act
(“ASIA”), which sought to prohibit all gambling on amateur sports
including high school, college and the Summer andWinter Olympic
Games—but that too was eventually struck down.
80
ASIA was
eventually voted against as opponents argued successfully that most
gambling took place through underground illegal gambling
schemes, and so passing a law to prohibit gambling would not put
an effective halt to the activity.
81
While PASPA did prohibit the states from legalizing sports
betting, it did not solve the problem in its entirety, leading Congress
to introduce this aforementioned additional legislation.
82
Unfortunately, this additional legislation, which sought to
strengthen and supplement PASPA, never made it out of Congress’
respective chambers.
83
Contrary to popular belief, PASPA did not make sports
gambling a federal crime; instead it allowed the Attorney General,
as well as professional and amateur sports organizations, to bring
civil actions to enjoin violations.
84
This stipulation provided the civil
remedy resulting in the landmark decision of May 2018 in Murphy
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.
85
Abramoff, a notorious lobbyist in Washington D.C., lobbied for the rejection of
the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000).
80
See generally United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation: Hearing on S.2340, Amateur Sports Integrity Act, 106th Cong.
(2000) (detailing how the Amateur Sports Integrity Act was introduced and
eventually struck down by Congress ); S. 2267 (106th): Amateur Sports Integrity
Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/s2267 (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019) (detailing the various bills introduced in Congress to combat
sports wagering in America that were all eventually struck down).
81
Id.
82
See Fielkow et al., supra note 23, at 32–33.
83
S. 2267 (106th): Amateur Sports Integrity Act, supra note 80.
84
28 U.S.C. Ch. 178: Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, §
3703 (2017).
85
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1471 (2018).
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III. MURPHY V. NATIONALCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
In the two and a half decades following PASPA’s enactment,
public perception of sports gambling began to shift from initial
intolerance and skepticism to overall acceptance.
86
Americans
became more open-minded about the practice of sports betting and
started adopting the idea that it was a victimless crime.
87
In 2016, a
poll conducted by Farleigh Dickinson University reported that 48%
of those polled were in favor of allowing states to legalize sports
gambling, and 39% opposed.
88
The next year, the University of
Massachusetts Lowell conducted a similar nationwide poll and
reported finding that a majority—55%—of people were in favor of
the legalization of sports betting, with only 33% opposing.
89
The substantial growth in support for legalized sports gambling
among Americans provided a platform for public interest and
incitement in New Jersey’s fight against PASPA for its state
legalization of sports betting.
90
Reacting to the nationwide recession
in the previous year, New Jersey legislators sought to save the state’s
deteriorating economy in 2010 in part through tax income generated
86
Emily Guskin & Rick Maese, Poll: For the First Time, Majority of
Americans Approve of Legalizing Sports Betting, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/poll-for-first-time-majority-of-
americans-approve-of-legalizing-sports-betting/2017/09/26/a18b97ca-a226-
11e7-b14f-f41773cd5a14_story.html.
87
Id.
88
These results are from Farleigh Dickinson University’s annual poll on
sports betting, as reported in the Fox Business Section. Thomas Barrabi, Legal
Sports Gambling: Americans Weigh in, FOXBUS. (Nov. 2, 2016),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/11/02/legal-sports-gambling-
americans-weigh-in.html.
89
Poll: Majority of Americans Support Legalization of Sports Betting,
UMASS LOWELL (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.uml.edu/News/press-
releases/2017/FantasySportsPoll09262017.aspx.
90
See generallyAndrew Beaton et al., Supreme Court Ruling for New Jersey
Opens Door to Sports Betting, WALL STREET J. (May 14, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-ruling-for-new-jersey-opens-door-
to-sports-betting-1526308430 (detailing how the public’s support for the
legalization of sports betting in New Jersey helped pave the way for its eventual
implementation).
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by sports gambling.
91
Although New Jersey did not take advantage
of the one-year window set forth in PASPA to authorize legalized
sports gambling in Atlantic City, by 2011 the state decided to pursue
legalization.
92
Under the direction of Governor Chris Christie, New
Jersey amended its state constitution, making it lawful for the state
legislature to authorize sports gambling, a move that knowingly
violated the prohibitions in PASPA.
93
New Jersey’s second substantive challenge to PASPA arose in
2012 when Governor Christie of New Jersey signed the Sports
Gambling Law, which authorized casinos and racetracks to offer Las
Vegas-style sports betting at their facilities.
94
The law quickly came
under attack by various sports organizations, both professional and
collegiate.
95
These organizations, including the National Football
League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League,
MLB and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”),
filed suit against Governor Christie and other state officials
96
(collectively “New Jersey”), seeking to enjoin the state from
implementing a sports gambling system on grounds that it violated
PASPA.
97
Responding to the NCAA’s claim, New Jersey argued that
PASPA “violates the system of dual sovereignty by prohibiting New
Jersey from enacting state sponsored sports betting.”
98
In making
91
CHRISTOPHER L. SORIANO, THE EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE SPORTS BETTING
IN NEW JERSEY—A HISTORY 22 (2013),
https://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/soriano_njlawyer_0413.pdf.
92
Id. at 22, 24.
93
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 396 (3d
Cir. 2016); Steve Berkowitz & Tom Schad, Your State-by-State Guide to Sports
Betting in Light of Supreme Court Ruling, USA TODAY (May 14, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2018/05/14/sports-gambling-status-
every-state-after-supreme-court-ruling/607334002/.
94
Polisano, supra note 13, at 463.
95
Id.
96
Other officials named as defendants included David L. Rebuck, Director
of the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement and Assistant Attorney
General of the State of New Jersey, and Frank Zanzuccki, Executive Director of
the New Jersey Racing Commission. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie,
926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 551 (D.N.J. 2013).
97
Id. at 561.
98
Id. at 563.
HIGH STAKES 293
this argument, the state principally relied on a landmark case in
which the United States Supreme Court struck down federal laws as
violating the anti-commandeering principle,
99
emphasizing that “the
Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress
the power to regulate individuals, not States.”
100
Relying on this
preceding case, New Jersey argued PASPA was similarly flawed in
that it regulated a state’s lawmaking ability by barring the state from
modifying or repealing its laws prohibiting sports gambling.
101
The
NCAA countered that PASPA is critically different from the
commandeering issue considered by the Supreme Court because it
did not command the states to take any affirmative action.
102
Without an affirmative federal command to do something, the
NCAA insisted, there could be no claim of commandeering.
103
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
found no anti-commandeering violation, and the case was appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
104
Through a split panel, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
decision.
105
The Third Circuit relied on the significant fact that
PASPA did not impose any affirmative command on the states,
noting that it did not “require or coerce the states to lift a finger.”
106
Reacting to the Third Circuit’s affirmation, New Jersey filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the anti-commandeering
issue. Certiorari was denied.
107
99
Steven Schwinn, Symposium: It’s Time to Abandon Anti-Commandeering
(but Don’t Count on This Supreme Court to do it), SCOTUS BLOG (Aug. 17,
2017), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-time-abandon-anti-
commandeering-dont-count-supreme-court/; see also New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (holding a federal law unconstitutional because “the Act
commandeer[ed] the legislative process of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program” (quoting Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287 (1981))).
100
New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
101
Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 561–62.
102
Id. at 562.
103
Id.
104
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir.
2016).
105
Id. at 215.
106
Id. at 231.
107
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1466 (2018).
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Following the Third Circuit’s 2013 decision, the New Jersey
legislature enacted a new law in 2014,
108
repealing its own state laws
criminalizing sports gambling and, in effect, legalizing the activity
indirectly without expressly stating such a purpose.
109
The new
legislation repealed the provisions of the state law’s prohibitions on
sports gambling insofar as they concerned the “placement and
acceptance of wagers” on sporting events by persons twenty-one
years of age or older at a horseracing track or a casino or gambling
house in Atlantic City.
110
The legislation also specified that the
repeal was effective only as to wagers on sporting events that did
not involve a New Jersey college team or collegiate event taking
place within the state.
111
Subsequently, the NCAA and
accompanying plaintiffs commenced a new action in the District
Court of New Jersey challenging this partial repeal.
112
The District Court issued a summary judgment ruling in favor of
the NCAA, and the case was eventually heard by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
113
The Third Circuit affirmed
the District Court’s decision, finding that the new law, no less than
the old one, violated PASPA by “authorizing” sports gambling.
114
The court concluded that the new law constituted an authorization
because it “selectively remove[d] a prohibition on sports wagering
in a manner that permissively channel[ed] wagering activity to
particular locations or operators.”
115
Having found that the 2014 law
violated PASPA’s prohibition of state authorization of sports
gambling schemes, the court went on to hold that PASPA’s
prohibition did not infringe upon the anti-commandeering principle
because it did not command states to take affirmative action.
116
New
Jersey appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted
108
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259,
263 (3d Cir. 2016).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Weinstein, supra note 2, at 1323.
113
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 799 F.3d at 263; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 508 (D.N.J. 2014).
114
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 396.
115
Id. at 401.
116
Id.
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certiorari to decide the constitutional question presented as to
whether PASPA impermissibly commandeered the states.
117
In May 2018, the Supreme Court issued a 6-3 ruling in favor of
the state of New Jersey.
118
The majority held that PASPA’s Section
3702(1) prohibited state authorization of sports gambling in
violation of anti-commandeering principles as recognized in New
York v. United States
119
in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
120
The Supreme Court did not address whether New Jersey’s reframed
law violated PASPA because it concluded that PASPA’s Anti-
Authorization and Anti-Licensing Provision (“AAALP”) violated
the United States Constitution.
121
Specifically, the Court held that
by “unequivocally dictat[ing] what a state legislature may and may
not do,” PASPA’s AAALP violated the anti-commandeering
doctrine of the Constitution.
122
Delivering the opinion of the Court,
Justice Alito reasoned that Congress has the power to regulate sports
gambling under the Commerce Clause, but if it fails to do so, that
117
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1468 (2018).
118
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch and, in part,
Breyer. Justices Thomas and Breyer (dissenting in part) separately filed
concurring opinions. Justice Ginsberg delivered the dissent, joined by Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor. Id. at 1461.
119
Under the anti-commandeering doctrine, “Congress may not simply
commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.” Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1467
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992)).
120
Id. at 1478.
121
Id. at 1481–82.
122
Id. at 1478. In a condemnation of PASPA, Justice Alito wrote:
The PASPA provision at issue here—prohibiting state
authorization of sports gambling—violates the anti-
commandeering rule. That provision unequivocally dictates
what a state legislature may and may not do. And this is true
under either our interpretation or that advocated by respondents
and the United States. In either event, state legislatures are put
under the direct control of Congress. It is as if federal officers
were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed
with the authority to stop legislators from voting on any
offending proposals. A more direct affront to state sovereignty
is not easy to imagine.
Id.
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power is then delegated to the states, who are free to act on their own
accord.
123
Moreover, the Supreme Court explained that PASPA
“regulate[s] state governments’ regulation” of practices in their own
states, involving their own citizens, and that the federal Constitution
does not grant such power to Congress, thus ultimately reversing the
decision of the Third Circuit.
124
Importantly,Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
did not affirmatively legalize sports betting in America; instead, it
attributed power to do so to the states.
125
Moving forward, the
decision of whether or not to legalize sports gambling will be left up
to state legislatures on a state-by-state basis.
126
State legislators will
have the power to decide whether or not to legalize sports betting
and permit sports betting schemes in their respective states.
127
In the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision, “[n]early [twenty] states
have introduced bills that could legalize sports betting,” and a
gaming institute estimates that “as many as [thirty-two] states could
offer legal sports betting within the next five years.”
128
Currently,
only eleven states have actually legalized sports gambling,
including Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey,
129
123
Id. at 1483–84.
124
Id. at 1478, 1485 (citation omitted).
125
See id. at 1490 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Ariane de Vogue & Maegen
Vazquez, Supreme Court Lets States Legalize Sports Gambling, CNN: POLITICS
(May 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/14/politics/sports-betting-ncaa-
supreme-court/index.html.
126
See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485 (2018).
127
Id.
128
Rick Maese, What the Supreme Court’s Sports Gambling Decision
Means, WASH. POST (May 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2018/05/14/what-the-
supreme-courts-sports-gambling-decision-means/?utm_term=.a1c8169c43a0.
129
In the first three months of 2019, more than $1 billion has been
legally wagered across the state. In March alone, New Jersey’s
sports betting handle made up a third of the total amount bet
legally on sports across all states with[in] legal markets. That
means valuable tax revenue, with nearly $20 million in new
revenue going to the state since the ban was lifted.
Michelle Minton, Legalized Sports Betting is Paying Off, THEHILL (Jun. 6, 2019),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/446232-legalized-sports-
betting-is-paying-off.
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New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and
West Virginia.
130
Looking to the future,
131
analysts in the sports
gambling industry predict that by the year 2022, more than half of
the fifty states will offer some form of a legalized sports betting
scheme.
132
IV. DANGERS OF LEGALIZED SPORTSBETTING INCOLLEGE
ATHLETICS
While legalized sports gambling on any sporting event can pose
a risk of corruption, gambling on amateur sports—particularly
college athletics—enhances this risk in large part because unlike
their professional counterparts, young collegiate athletes do not
receive compensation in the form of a salary.
133
Gambling on
college sports has become increasingly popular with the NCAA
Men’s Basketball Tournament (known as “March Madness”), as it
is the second-largest event for sports gambling in the world, only
second to the Super Bowl.
134
Legalizing sports wagering on college
130
Alexandra Licata, 42 States Have or are Moving Towards Legalizing
Sports Betting —Here are the States Where Sports Betting is Legal, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 2, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/states-where-sports-
betting-legal-usa-2019-7 (showing that the states that are currently debating
sports betting bills include California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Carolina).
131
Additionally, Iowa legalized sports gambling in August 2019, and
Indiana is set to legalize it in September 2019. Steve Silverman, Legalized Sports
Gambling Passes $10 Billon, Likely Just Tip of the Iceberg, FORBES (Aug. 29,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevesilverman/2019/08/29/legalized-
sports-gambling-passes-10-billion-likely-just-tip-of-the-iceberg/#739ba7e7c223.
132
Mike Fish & David Purdum, Sports Leagues Stand Pat as Legal
Gambling Spreads, ESPN (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/24783436/sports-leagues-ncaa-leave-
teams-players-trainers-officials-own-figure-how-best-navigate-evolving-
gambling-landscape.
133
Sean Isabella, Legal Sports Gambling Could Put NCAA Athletes at Risk,
VALDOSTA DAILY TIMES (Jun. 29, 2018),
https://www.valdostadailytimes.com/sports/national_sports/legal-sports-
gambling-could-put-ncaa-athletes-at-risk/article_81965018-3ee5-5ec3-bd08-
fa172ba2905b.html.
134
According to the American Gaming Association, an estimated $10 billion
were bet by Americans on the 2018 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament.
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athletics poses grave dangers, including: (1) compromising the
integrity of the game; (2) preying on the vulnerability of college
student athletes; and (3) increasing the risk for corruption.
135
A. Compromising the Integrity of the Game
Athletes and fans participate in and watch sporting events for the
competition, the sense of comradery and for the love of the game.
136
The implementation of legalized sports betting threatens the
integrity of these sports and taints them for spectators and
participants alike.
137
Many believe that the legalization of sports
betting will lead to inevitable problems and jeopardize the integrity
of all those involved.
138
When interviewed about the legalization of
sports betting in Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh Athletic
Director Heather Lyke responded that sports betting would have a
“negative effect on the integrity of college athletics and on the
health, safety, and welfare of [the University’s] students.”
139
While
there are potential risks for all athletes, young students’ mental
health, safety and welfare are priorities that are not worth
endangering, making this a heightened risk area. Since its inception
in 1906, the NCAA has deemed its primary goal to be the protection
of student athletes from exploitation, both on and off the playing
However, only three of the wagers made toward that sum were placed legally.
Kyle Boon, 2018 NCAA Tournament: Estimated $10 Billion Bet on March
Madness, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 12, 2018, 11:35 AM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/2018-ncaa-tournament-
estimated-10-billion-to-bet-on-march-madness.
135
Isabella, supra note 133.
136
See TimUrban,Why Sports Fans Are Sports Fans, WAITBUTWHY (Mar.
18, 2014), https://waitbutwhy.com/2014/03/sports-fans-sports-fans.html.
137
Caitlin D. Buckstaff, Covering the Spread: An Assessment of Amateurism
and Vulnerability of Student-Athletes in an Emerging Culture of Sports Wagering,
16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 133, 135 (2013).
138
Keith Miller, Is the Legalization of Sports Betting in the US Inevitable?,
THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 12, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://theconversation.com/is-
the-legalization-of-sports-betting-in-the-us-inevitable-50280.
139
Mark Wogenrich, Penn State Proposes 2-Year Halt to College Sports
Betting in Pennsylvania, MORNING CALL (June 29, 2018 9:06 PM),
http://www.mcall.com/sports/gambling/mc-spt-penn-state-football-sports-
betting-20180627-story.html.
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field.
140
At its origin, the NCAA’s vision of the student athlete was
a “well-rounded gentleman who played sports purely for
entertainment with no designs on (or need for) compensation.”
141
Today, the NCAA is an association comprised of 1,061 colleges and
universities
142
that are mandated to adhere to its rules and
regulations in order to maintain membership.
143
In furtherance of
this goal, the NCAA makes clear that its number one priority is
“fostering clean and fair competition among member schools.”
144
The NCAA is primarily concerned with maintaining the integrity of
the game and the sportsmanship of all of its student athletes at all
times.
145
Overall, the NCAA believes that sports should be enjoyed and
appreciated for the inherent benefits of playing and spectating.
Ideally, athletes participate in sports for the pure competition,
enjoyment and the self-affirmation they provide.
146
Likewise,
spectators and fans watch and follow sporting events generally for
entertainment, a sense of unity and the uplifting notion that on any
night an underdog athlete or team can rise above itself and touch
greatness, defying all odds or expectations. However, the emergence
140
See Dan Treadwater, Why Does the NCAA Exist?, HUFFPOST (Aug. 6,
2013, 1:39 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/johnny-manziel-ncaa-
eligibility_b_3020985?.
141
ElizabethMcCurrach &Ronald Gaither,How the Sports Betting Decision
May Affect College Athletes, LAW360 (July 31, 2018),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1068712/how-the-sports-betting-decision-
may-affect-college-athletes.
142
The membership of the 1,037 colleges and universities is divided into
three legislative and competitive divisions (Division-I, Division-II and Division-
III). Huffey, supra note 19, at 33; McCurrach & Gaither, supra note 141.
143
McCurrach & Gaither, supra note 141.
144
Buckstaff, supra note 137, at 146.
145
See NCAA 2019–20 NCAA: DIVISION 1 MANUAL ¶ 2.10 (2019)
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D120.pdf [hereinafter
NCAA MANUAL] (defining the principle of competitive equity).
146
See generally Ann Josephson, 15 Reasons Competitive Sports Are Great
for Kids (That Have Nothing to Do with Winning), HUFFPOST (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/15-reason-competitive-sports-are-great-for-
kids-that-have-nothing-to-do-with-winning_b_7219150 (detailing the social
benefits and personal growth that involvement in sports provides America’s
youth).
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of legalized sports betting threatens the integrity of sports and their
participating athletes.
147
The NCAA cannot control whether the public gambles on the
outcome of sporting events; however, it can control how the games
are played and try to ensure that they are played with honesty and
sportsmanship.
148
As a combative mechanism to the looming threat
that legalized sports betting brought in the wake of Murphy v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association,
149
the NCAA has relied on
enforcing its bylaws, which prohibit coaches, players and others
affiliated with the NCAA and their respective member organizations
from participating sports wagering.
150
The NCAA is extremely committed to ensuring all college
sports remain free from any sort of sports wagering by NCAA
athletes and employs a staff whose chief focus is ensuring
147
Buckstaff, supra note 137, at 135.
148
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 145, ¶ 10.01.1 (noting the “honor and
dignity of fair play and the generally recognized high standards associated with
wholesome competitive sports”).
149
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484 (2018) (“The legalization of
sports gambling requires an important policy choice, but the choice is not ours to
make.”).
150
NCAA Bylaw 10.3: Sports Wagering Activities[:]
Staff members of a member conference, staff members of the
athletics department of a member institution and student-
athletes shall not knowingly:
(a) Provide information to individuals involved in organized
gambling activities concerning intercollegiate athletics
competition;
(b) Solicit a bet on any intercollegiate team;
(c) Accept a bet on any team representing this institution;
(d) Solicit or accept a bet on any intercollegiate competition for
any item (e.g., cash, shirt, dinner) that has a tangible value; or
(e) Participate in any gambling activity that involves
intercollegiate athletics, through a bookmaker, a parlay card or
any other method employed by organized gambling.
See NCAAMANUAL, supra note 145, at ¶ 10.3 (prohibiting coaches, players and
staff members associated with a member’s athletics department, among others,
from participating in sports wagering).
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compliance with regard to gambling.
151
However, the NCAA
regulations fall short because the NCAA can only enforce
regulations against those individuals over of which it has authority:
student athletes, coaches and athletic personnel who belong to the
NCAA.
152
The NCAA has no authority over the public placing
wagers on college sporting events.
153
The NCAA’s limited authority
significantly constrains its ability to wholly regulate the ever-
growing phenomenon of sports betting.
154
B. Vulnerability of Collegiate Student-Athletes
Unlike their professional counterparts, amateur athletes—
especially those in college—are exceedingly more vulnerable to the
influences and corruption that sports gambling brings.
155
It is the
young age, access to gambling and lack of compensation that, taken
together, leave college athletes susceptible to the dangers of
legalized sports betting.
156
i. A College Athlete’s Young Age
When student athletes enter college after graduating high school,
many are leaving home for the first time.
157
Each August, young
151
See John W. Kindt & Thomas Asmar, College and Amateur Sports
Gambling: Gambling Away Our Youth?, 8 VILL. SPORTS& ENT. L.J., 221, 224–
49 (2002).
152
Buckstaff, supra note 137, at 151.
153
Id.
154
Ben Nuckols, NCAA Can’t Keep Tournament Games Away from Legal
Gambling, AP NEWS (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://www.apnews.com/66e15b3a43ef49619c57467cecda0b8c.
155
Joseph Goodman, Vulnerable to Corruption, NCAA Remains Worried
About Daily Fantasy Sports, AL.COM (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.al.com/sports/2015/09/vulnerable_to_corruption_ncaa.html.
156
Steve Berkowitz & Erik Brady, Legalized Sports Betting Will Wreak
Havoc on College Athletics. Or Not, USA TODAY (May 31, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2018/05/31/sports-betting-
college-athletics-world-concerned-supreme-court-ruling/645367002/.
157
See generally Emma Beernink,What it Is Like Leaving Home for College
for the First Time, ODYSSEY (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.theodysseyonline.com/leaving-home-time.
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men and women from across the country unload suitcases and mini
fridges in a ten-by-ten concrete-walled dormitory room to begin
their college experiences.
158
However, in addition to a full course
load, grappling with being away from loved ones and trying to
develop a social life, these youngmen and women are also collegiate
athletes who will have to practice up to twenty hours per week.
159
Though rewarding due to the competition and glory, playing a
collegiate sport, particularly at the Division-I level, adds an
immense amount of stress and pressure to a young student’s life.
160
It is often forgotten that these athletes are just eighteen to twenty-
four-year-old young adults.
161
Sports betting in college athletics
places an undue burden and enormous amount of additional pressure
on these young athletes.
162
ii. Accessibility of Collegiate Athletes
While professional athletes remain secluded from the press and
general public, hidden behind locker room walls and bodyguards,
163
college athletes are far more accessible to the public. Imagine sitting
in a Thursday morning lecture at an undergraduate university. In
walks the starting quarterback of the football team wearing a sling
on his right throwing arm. The football team has its biggest game of
the season this upcoming Saturday night against a league rival.
158
E.g., Joe E. Berry Hall, C. CHARLESTON,
http://housing.cofc.edu/residence-halls/joe-berry-hall.php (last visited Sept. 29,
2019).
159
See NCAAMANUAL, supra note 145, ¶¶ 13.11.2.1(h), 17.01.
160
See Jason Perry, Dealing with Stress as a College Athlete, ATHLETE
NETWORK, https://an.athletenetwork.com/blog/dealing-with-stress-as-a-college-
athlete (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
161
US College Student Demographics in 2012, MARKETING CHARTS (Sept.
12, 2013), https://www.marketingcharts.com/demographics-and-audiences/men-
demographics-and-audiences-36555.
162
Jill R. Dorson, Betting on College Sports - or Not - Often a Game of
Political Football, SPORTS HANDLE (July 11, 2019),
https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-on-college-sports/.
163
The NFL specifically places strict regulations on locker room access for
the media and the public to protect its players. 2018 MEDIA ACCESS POLICY,
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1 (2018),
https://operations.nfl.com/media/3176/2018-nfl-media-access-policy.pdf.
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Because of the buzz surrounding the game, many bets will be placed,
and the quarterback’s team is projected to win by twenty points. But,
because that quarterback attended the lecture to further his own
education as a normal student, everyone who saw him walking to
the classroom, sitting in on the lecture and walking back to his dorm
now has information that the starting quarterback may be sidelined
for the game on Saturday. Anyone who has seen him and discovered
his injury can now place more informed bets based on what was
observed or sell that valuable information to other gamblers.
What is often overlooked is that college athletes are first and
foremost students who attend classes and interact with the rest of the
student body. The legalization of college sports betting brings new
challenges, such as the issue of gamblers, “including classmates and
neighbors,” trying to coax out non-public information from insiders
regarding critical factors affecting the outcome of a game, such as
“injuries or academic standing.”
164
Phil Esten, the deputy athletic
director at Pennsylvania State University,
165
commented, “Your
mind goes to the worst possible scenario. . . . You think about where
student athletes could be influenced, where somebody tries to
intercept them as they’re going from study hall to dorm rooms to
cafeteria, to try to get information from them.”
166
These student
athletes are far more vulnerable and exposed than their professional
counterparts and should therefore be offered additional protections.
164
AndrewMaykuth,What Are the Odds? Colleges Fear Sports Betting Will
Lead to Cheating, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 14, 2018),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/college-sports-betting-ncaa-laws-
pennsylvania-new-jersey-20180914.html.
165
Phil Esten is currently in his fifth year as Deputy Director of Athletics
and Chief Operating Officer for Penn State Intercollegiate Athletics. Jill
Beckman, Phil Esten Named Deputy Director of Athletics and Chief Operating
Officer for Intercollegiate Athletics, DAILY COLLEGIAN (Oct. 6, 2014),
https://www.collegian.psu.edu/sports/article_22b8fcfa-4da4-11e4-84ae-
0017a43b2370.html.
166
Maykuth, supra note 164.
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iii. Lack of Compensation in College Sports
Professional athletes sign contracts that promise them millions
of dollars for their athletic abilities.
167
They have the financial
security to protect them from becoming predictable targets for
match-fixing scandals.
168
College athletes, however, are not
compensated for their athletic abilities beyond the costs of tuition,
room and board and therefore are left to cover their own additional
personal expenses.
169
In addition to a substantial salary, professional
athletes also may receive financial incentives such as endorsements,
which college athletes are also prohibited from receiving.
170
The
NCAA awards an average of $2.6 billion in athletic scholarships
each year through its 351 collegiate institutions.
171
Although the
NCAA compensates its athletes in the form of academic scholarship
and room and board, it fails to recognize that college scholarships
do not account for additional living expenses.
172
According to a
study conducted by the National College Players Association and
Drexel University, many college athletes live below the poverty
167
Courtney Connley &Kerri Anne Renzulli,Here’s What the Average NFL
Player Makes in a Season, CNBC (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/01/heres-what-the-average-nfl-players-makes-
in-a-season.html.
168
Richard Lapchick, Sports Betting: Itch to Fix Games, Shave Points Grows
for College Athletes, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 25, 2018),
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-tempted-to-bet-student-athletes-
front-burner-20180521-story.html.
169
Id.
170
Student athletes who pursue endorsement deals or professional contracts
will face the consequence of losing their eligibility to participate in intercollegiate
competitions. See NCAAMANUAL, supra note 145, ¶ 12.1.2. The NCAA permits
the use of a student athlete’s likeness on sports-related educational materials like
books and films, provided that the student athlete does not “expressly or implicitly
endorse a commercial product or service.” Id. ¶ 12.5.1.5.
171
Chris Talgo & Emma Kaden, To Pay or Not to Pay: The Big Business of
College Sports, INV. BUS. DAILY (Sept. 14, 2018),
https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/college-sports-pay-
scholarships-ncaa.
172
Marykate Edmunds, The Financial Gap Between Athletic Scholarships
and Athlete Expenses, SPORTSMGMT. UNDERGRADUATE (May 1, 2014), at 4.
HIGH STAKES 305
line.
173
This finding adds to the vulnerability of college athletes and
their susceptibility to accept monetary bribes.
174
The NCAA Annual Handbook stipulates that “a student-athlete
shall not receive any extra benefit.”
175
“Receipt by a student-athlete
of an award, benefit or expense allowance not authorized by NCAA
legislation renders the student-athlete ineligible for athletics
competitions in the sport for which the improper award, benefit or
expense was received.”
176
In addition to tuition costs and room and
board costs, the NCAA allows institutions also to compensate
student athletes for medical and other related expenses.
177
Student
athletes are granted permissible benefits such as meals, team-issued
clothing and other expenses relating to an academic purpose.
178
However, student athletes are not permitted to receive any “extra
benefits” from the institution.
179
These extra benefits include, but
are not limited to, a loan of money, a guarantee of bond, an
173
Study College Athletes Worth Six Figures Live Below Federal Poverty
Line, DREXEL NOW (Sept. 13, 2011),
https://drexel.edu/now/archive/2011/September/Study-College-Athletes-Worth-
Six-Figures-Live-Below-Federal-Poverty-Line/.
174
Professor of Sports Law at Syracuse University John Wolohan explains:
Professional players make too much [money] to risk throwing
a game . . . but a kid on a full athletic scholarship with no money
in the bank is much more susceptible when someone
approaches him and says, “Hey, you’re playing Colgate tonight.
You guys are favored by 20 points. Here’s $5,000. Make sure
it’s under 20.”
Camila Domonoske et al., Sports Betting Ruling Could Have Consequences,
Especially for College Athletes, NPR (May 14, 2018, 10:33 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/14/589087523/supreme-court-
rules-states-are-free-to-legalize-sports-betting (quoting Professor of Sports Law
John Wolohan).
175
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 145, ¶ 16.01.1.
176
Id. The NCAA considers as award to be an “item given in recognition of
athletics participation or performance.” The NCAA considers an extra benefit to
be “any special arrangement by an institutional employee or representative of the
institution’s athletics interests to provide a student-athlete or the student-athlete
family member or friend a benefit not expressly authorized by the NCAA
legislation.” Id. ¶¶ 16.02.1, 16.02.3.
177
See id. ¶ 16.4.
178
Id. ¶ 16.11.
179
Id. ¶ 16.11.2.1.
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automobile or the use of an automobile, transportation, or signing or
co-signing a note with an outside agency to arrange a loan.
180
College athletics has grown into a billion-dollar business.
181
Colleges and universities profit immensely from ticket sales,
182
radio and television contracts,
183
merchandising,
184
and the
increased alumni donations and endowments athletic programs
bring.
185
Recently, many of these college athletes have voiced their
frustrations with the lack of compensation as their names and
likenesses are used to drive massive amounts of revenue for the
NCAA and their respective universities.
186
For example, in 2018,
the University of Alabama Athletic Program’s annual revenue
increased to approximately $174.3 million with the football program
alone generating $108.2 million.
187
Similarly, the University of
Texas Athletic Department generated nearly $215 million in
revenue in 2017.
188
Measuring public opinion on the matter, the
Washington Post conducted a survey asking the public whether
college football and basketball players “deserve to be paid in
180
Id. ¶ 16.11.2.2.
181
Talgo & Kaden, supra note 171.
182
In 2008, the University of Texas generated the largest revenue of ticket
sales compared to other colleges, reaching approximately $45 million in sales.
Paula Lavigne, The Money That Moves College Sports, ESPN (Dec. 7, 2009),
https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/news/story?id=4722523.
183
Paula Lavigne, Rich Get Richer in College Sports as Poorer Schools
Struggle to Keep Up, ABCNEWS (Sep. 4, 2016, 9:20 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/rich-richer-college-sports-poorer-schools-
struggle/story?id=41857422.
184
Football by the (Negative) Numbers, AUSTIN CHRON. (Apr. 2, 2010),
https://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2010-04-02/988248/.
185
Benjamin Baumer & Andrew Zimbalist, The Impact of College Athletic
Success on Donations and Applicant Quality, 17 INT’L J. FINANCIAL STUD. 1, 1
(2019).
186
Buckstaff, supra note 137, at 148–49.
187
Michael Casagrande, Alabama Athletics Brought in $174.3 Million Last
Year, AL.COM (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.al.com/alabamafootball/index.ssf/2018/01/alabama_athletics_broug
ht_in_1.html.
188
Steve Berkowitz, Texas Athletics Program Reports More Than $219
Million in Revenue During the 2018 Fiscal Year, USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2019,
7:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2019/01/15/texas-athletics-
program-had-over-219-million-revenue-2018/2586818002/.
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addition to receiving scholarships based on how much money they
generate for universities, or [whether] scholarships [are] adequate
compensation.”
189
The results indicated that “[thirty-eight percent]
of Americans believe college football and basketball players should
be compensated beyond [their] scholarships,” while the fifty-two
percent majority “believe[s] college scholarships are enough
compensation.”
190
Those who oppose the additional compensation of college
athletes argue that the “vast majority of college athletes, including
most females, participate in sports that do not produce much, if any
revenue.”
191
The question then arises: who deserves to be paid?
Because the majority of college athletic programs are funded by
general university budgets, there is not enough money to pay every
NCAA athlete.
192
While schools with thriving athletic programs
such as the University of Alabama and the University of Texas have
enough money in their budgets and revenue to pay all of their
athletes, smaller Division-I schools, such as those in the Metro-
Atlantic Athletic Conference,
193
simply do not have large enough
budgets to pay their athletes.
194
Paying some NCAA athletes and not
others would be neither moral nor legal.
195
Those who oppose
additional compensation also argue that other than football and
men’s basketball players,
196
there are few (if any) student athletes
189
Talgo & Kaden, supra note 171.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
See Cork Gaines, Paying College Athletes Would Cost $200 Million Each
Year, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 20, 2011, 10:35 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/paying-college-athletes-would-cost-200-
million-each-year-2011-8.
193
The Metro-Atlantic Athletic Conference is comprised of Canisius
University, Fairfield University, Iona College, Manhattan College, Marist
College, Monmouth University, Niagara University, Quinnipiac University, Rider
University, Saint Peter’s College and Siena College. About the MAAC, MAAC,
https://maacsports.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
194
See Gaines, supra note 192.
195
Talgo & Kaden supra note 171.
196
In 2013, the median annual revenue generated at the 126 largest
(Football Bowl Subdivision) programs from football was $20.3
million and from men’s basketball $5.6 million. The next
highest median revenue was $1.0 million from men’s ice
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who are personally responsible for generating more revenue for
college athletics programs than the value of their scholarships.
197
Decisions to compensate athletes, then, are complicated not only by
questions of finance, but by questions of basic fairness and
practicality.
198
Conversely, those in favor of additionally compensating college
athletes argue that the NCAA and participating universities profit
exponentially off of student athletes and that therefore the athletes
deserve to share in the profits.
199
To illustrate, if merchandisers, as
well as the institution, are benefiting off sales of basketball jerseys
with their student athletes’ names on the back, supporters argue that
the student athletes should then also be entitled to profit off the sales.
Again, due to the lack of compensation despite revenue generation
off their likenesses, college athletes have a unique vulnerability
compared to their professional counterparts who are compensated
with million-dollar contracts.
C. Increased Risk of Corruption
It is no secret that the world of sports has a long and all too
familiar past with scandal and corruption.
200
By reading the sports
section of the newspaper, listening to the radio, or watching
ESPN,
201
people are confronted with the indignity that often plagues
the industry.
202
Scandal and corruption long predated the Supreme
hockey. Beyond men’s ice hockey, no other men’s or women’s
intercollegiate sport at [Football Bowl Subdivision] institutions
generated median revenues exceeding $600,000 in 2013.
Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, The Case for Paying College Athletes,
29 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 118 n.4 (2015).
197
Jeffrey Dorfman, Pay College Athletes? They’re Already Paid Up to
$125,000 Per Year, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2013/08/29/pay-college-athletes-
theyre-already-paid-up-to-125000year/#4c47a7742b82.
198
See Talgo & Kaden supra note 171.
199
Id.
200
See Chase, supra note 10.
201
ESPN stands for Entertainment and Sports Programming Network.
202
See, e.g., Ante Z. Udovicic, Special Report: Sports and Gambling a Good
Mix? I Wouldn’t Bet on It, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 401, 403 (1998); Steve Wyche,
NFL Shows Evidence of Saints’ ‘Bounty’ Program to Media, NFL (June 19, 2012
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Court’s decision in Murphy,
203
particularly so in college athletics.
The first of a wave of major reported college basketball gambling
scandals occurred in 1951, involving thirty-two athletes from seven
different universities.
204
Over the course of three years,
205
the group
of athletes fixed
206
approximately eighty-six collegiate basketball
games by engaging in point-shaving.
207
Point-shaving, the most
common form of cheating in sports, is a federal crime.
208
We can
consider this example to illustrate the practice of point-shaving: a
basketball player may fix a game by purposefully missing a free
throw at the end of the game. Although the missed shot will not
affect the outcome of the game, it could impact the point spread and
ultimately help gamblers win certain wages. Any athlete caught
1:13 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d829f19d3/article/nfl-shows-
evidence-of-saints-bounty-program-to-media (discussing a scandal involving
financial bonuses paid to professional football players in exchange for injuring
opponents);Most Significant College Sports Scandals, USATODAY SPORTS (Oct.
22, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/picture-
gallery/sports/ncaaf/2013/09/13/most-significant-college-sports-
scandals/2792053 (describing scandals involving collegiate athletes and coaches
spanning from 1950 to 2013).
203
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S.Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018).
204
Joe Goldstein, Explosion: 1951 Scandals Threaten College Hoops, ESPN
CLASSIC (Nov. 19, 2003),
https://www.espn.com/classic/s/basketball_scandals_explosion.html.
205
Id.
206
Fixing refers to the act of point-shaving. Point-shaving is “an attempt (as
by a member of the team favored to win [the game]) to influence the final score
of a game so that the predicted winner wins by less than the point spread.” Point-
Shaving, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/point%20shaving (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). To better
understand the betting aspect of point-shaving and fixing games, assume that the
game a better fixed was between Team A and Team B. Team A was favored to
win by 10 points. That meant bookies would accept your bet if you thought Team
A would win by more than 10 points. The better had told his bribed player—on
Team B—that his team must lose by at least 11 points. Therefore, the better bet,
correctly, on Team A to win by more than 10 points.
207
Goldstein, supra note 204.
208
Ray Gustini, How Point Shaving Works, THEATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/04/how-point-shaving-
works/349575/.
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shaving points permanently loses his or her NCAA eligibility,
209
and
in all states a point-shaving player can be arrested and prosecuted.
210
Steven “Hedake” Smith, a former team captain of the Arizona State
University men’s basketball team, is a prime example.
211
Smith was
convicted of point-shaving and conspiracy to commit sports bribery
in 1997 and served nearly a year in prison following his
conviction.
212
Point-shaving is not only illegal, leading to
repercussions such as prison time and fines, but it also compromises
the integrity of the game and the public’s perception of athletics.
213
Gambling, thus, raises suspicions about point-shaving and
game-fixing. If gambling and the number of gambling-related sports
scandals continue to increase, fans may reasonably suspect improper
motives and will be forced to question a player, a coach, or a referee
and wonder why a player missed a free throw, why a kicker missed
an extra point, why a coach benched a key player, or why an umpire
blew a close call at home plate. Perhaps one of the greatest instances
of corruption in sports occurred during the 2007 NBA season.
214
NBA referee of thirteen years Tim Donaghy was found to be betting
on NBA games, including many of the games he was officiating.
215
During a thorough investigation it was found that Donaghy’s illegal
gambling scheme was orchestrated by the notorious Gambino crime
family.
216
Donaghy stated that members of the mafia organization
threatened his family and forced him to bet and relay his picks to the
mob.
217
A study completed by the University of Michigan found that
209
College athletes must maintain their NCAA eligibility status in order to
remain on their respective teams. See NCAAMANUAL, supra note 145, ¶ 12.7.
210
See Gustini, supra note 208.
211
Michael McCarthy, Point Shaving Remains a Concern in College
Athletics, USA TODAY (May 15, 2007),
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2007-05-08-point-shaving-
cover_N.htm.
212
Id.
213
Udovicic, supra note 202, at 411.
214
Donaghy Sentenced to 15 Months in Prison in Gambling Scandal, ESPN
(July 29, 2008), https://www.espn.com/nba/news/story?id=3509440.
215
Ex-NBA Ref Tim Donaghy’s Personal Foul, 60 Minutes, CBSNEWS (Dec.
6, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/03/60minutes/main588054
7.shtml.
216
Id.
217
Id.
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eighty-four percent of college referees admitted to participating in
some sort of gambling since beginning their careers,
218
and
approximately twenty percent also admitted to gambling on NCAA
basketball tournaments.
219
Furthermore, multiple referees who
officiated particular games said that the gambling affected their
judgment.
220
Economic models have suggested that with the
legalization of sports betting and an increased interest in the United
States, there will be an increase in corruption specifically within
college sports.
221
Scandals and incidents of cheating have large repercussions in
college athletics specifically.
222
Public scandals can lead to drastic
financial losses for the universities;
223
coaches and athletic
department staff may lose their jobs;
224
schools may lose donations
from sponsors and alumni; recruiting efforts may suffer; and
schools’ reputable images may be tarnished.
225
A team’s hard-
fought victory may be lost as the result of one player’s involvement
in a corrupt practice, such as point-shaving and game-fixing, like in
1961 when St. Joseph’s University was stripped of its third-place
finish in the NCAAmen’s basketball tournament.
226
Boston College
218
Amateur Sports Integrity Act and Gambling in Amateur Sports: Hearing
on S.2340 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Hon. Sam Brownback, U.S. Senator from Kansas).
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Brad R. Humphreys, An Overview of Sports Betting Regulation in the
United States 9 (West Virginia Univ. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper Series No.
17–31, 2017).
222
Udovicic, supra note 202, at 412.
223
See, e.g., Stephanie Hughes, Assessing the Impact of NCAA Scandals: An
Exploratory Analysis, 3 INT’L J. SPORTMKT. &MGMT. 2, 2 (2008).
224
Jim Valvano was forced to resign as head coach of the North Carolina
State men’s basketball team in the wake of point-shaving allegations in 1990. See,
e.g., David Teel, Shamed Valvano to Step Down, DAILY PRESS (Aug. 1989),
https://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-xpm-19890826-1989-08-26-8908250402-
story.html.
225
Id.
226
College Scandals, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 1998, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-mar-27-sp-33239-story.html.
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has been especially rattled by sports gambling.
227
In 1979, Rick
Kuhn, a former basketball player for the college, was convicted of
accepting monetary bribes from the Italian mafia to shave points off
of the scores during five games of the 1978–79 basketball season.
228
Kuhn was later sentenced to ten years in prison for his involvement
in the scheme.
229
The overarching theme is that legalized sports gambling poses
severe risks for collegiate athletes that can potentially lead to a
forfeiture of eligibility or even criminal prosecution and a jail
sentence.
230
Moving forward, the NCAA and its universities must
implement precautionary measures to avoid the risk of corruption in
collegiate sports, while retaining their integrity. Tom McMillen,
President and CEO of the NCAA Division-I Athletic Directors’
Association, explained that unless the NCAA and its universities
find a way to protect student athletes to ensure proper compliance
with NCAA bylaws, major scandals will be inevitable in the
future.
231
227
See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1983); David
Purdum, The Worst Fix Ever, ESPN (Oct. 3, 2014),
https://www.espn.com/espn/chalk/story/_/id/11633538/betting-chronicling-
worst-fix-ever-1978-79-bc-point-shaving-scandal.
228
Burke, 700 F.2d at 73–74. The Boston College basketball point-shaving
scheme was the “brainchild of Rocco and his brother Anthony [Perla]. The Perla
brothers were small-time gamblers” who elicited Kuhn, a high school friend of
Rocco that was entering his senior year at Boston College:
[The Perla brothers and Kuhn] would select . . . certain
basketball games where the projected point spread separating
[Boston College] from its opponent was expected to be
significant. Kuhn would [then] be responsible for ensuring, by
his play on the court, that [Boston College] fell short of the
proposed point spread. Thus, for example, if participating
bookmakers determined [Boston] to be an eight-point favorite
in a particular game, Kuhn would be paid his bonus, usually
$2,500, if [Boston] won by less than eight points.
Id.
229
Rick Kuhn Sentenced to 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1982, at 17.
230
Domonoske, supra note 174.
231
Adam Edelman, As States Race to Launch Sports Betting, Calls Grow for
Congress to Protect Games’ Integrity, NBC NEWS (May 14, 2018, 6:30 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/states-race-launch-sports-
betting-calls-grow-congress-protect-games-n874051.
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V. OFFERING A SOLUTION
The elimination of PASPA opened doors to a massive regulated
sports betting market. A recent study conducted by Eilers & Krejcik
Gaming estimated that, within the next three years, the U.S. sports
betting market will generate about $18 billion in revenue.
232
With
the legalized sports gambling market currently expanding and
growing each day, federal regulation is needed to protect those
involved and implicated.
A. Implementing Federal Regulation
In the majority opinion of Murphy v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, Justice Samuel Alito wrote, “The legalization
of sports gambling requires an important policy choice, but the
choice is not ours to make. Congress can regulate sports gambling
directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its
own.”
233
Justice Alito’s statement “left the door open for Congress
to step in and pre-empt the states if it want[ed] to set up a federal
regulatory system.”
234
Presently, an obvious consequence of each
state enacting its own legislation is a lack of uniformity and
consistency,
235
further complicated by the possibilities of online
gambling. In responding to this lack of continuity in the states’ laws,
Congress must implement a gambling policy at the federal level to
promote one cohesive construct throughout the country to which all
states must adhere. The NCAA has stated, “While we recognize the
232
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critical role of state governments, strong federal standards are
necessary to safeguard the integrity of college sports and the athletes
who play these games at all levels.”
236
Importantly, Congressional
action through federal legislation “would set out the terms of
licensing and regulation,” and “direct a federal agency or entity to
administer the law . . . and coordinate regulation with states.”
237
This
nationalized approach to legalized sports betting would allow states
to either opt into or opt out of the federal regulation.
238
It would still
be left up to the individual state legislatures whether or not each state
would participate in legalized sports betting, but if a state elected to
do so, it would be subject to the federal regulations. A state could
regulate sports gambling as it sees fit, so long as no state regulation
exceeds the limitations set forth in the federal regulation, thus
respecting anti-commandeering and dual sovereignty.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that a federal regulation of
sports betting would “facilitate the collection of data so that threats
to game integrity could be quickly identified and acted upon by
federal law enforcement[,] offer[ing] efficiencies that state
regulation could not achieve.”
239
Consistent regulations and a
uniform federal structure throughout the country would help to
better protect against potential abuse of the regulations and serve an
important public policy objective.
240
Those in favor of sports betting being regulated by the federal
government have compared it to regulating securities.
241
“Securities
regulation and sports wagering have striking similarities. Both
concern the regulation of exchanges involving contracts where the
purchaser/bett[e]r is attempting to earn profits based on a future
contingent event.”
242
Much like how securities in our country are
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regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and federal
securities laws, sports wagering should also be regulated through a
federal agency and federal legislation to ensure compliance, equal
competition and a fair market.
243
B. Taking Federal Regulation a Step Further:
Implementing a Federal Ban on Amateur Sports Betting
Presently, Congress holds the power to enact legislation to limit
the scope of legalized sports betting in our country.
244
As detailed,
legalized sports betting in college athletics poses a greater risk than
in the world of professional sports.
245
Congress must act fast and
wield its power to limit the scope of legalized sports betting to avoid
history repeating itself in the form of infamous scandals and
depleted confidence in sports. Congress has made several attempts
to ban wagering on amateur sports, exemplifying its need for
regulation. In 2000, Representative Lindsey Graham introduced a
bill which ultimately failed but proposed a federal ban on all college
athletics gambling.
246
Congress acknowledged that amateur
athletes, specifically those in college, need to be afforded special
protections from the pressures and corruption legalized sports
gambling presents.
247
Some states that have passed legislation legalizing sports
gambling, including New Jersey, have added provisions in their
sports betting legislation that prevent wagering on college
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athletics.
248
For example, under New Jersey’s new sports betting
law, the public cannot place bets on high school sports, on college
events taking place in the state, or on any event involving a New
Jersey college team anywhere.
249
To illustrate, if the Seton Hall
University basketball team from South Orange, New Jersey is
playing DePaul University from Chicago, Illinois, and that game is
taking place in Illinois, the public cannot legally place a bet on that
game in New Jersey. That states are placing this caveat on their new
sports betting legislation shows a sense of fear.
250
It may be that state
legislatures are affording protections to their own college athletes
because they acknowledge the risks that legalized betting on college
sporting events can incur. Despite the positive step that New Jersey
has taken,
251
it is problematic that not all student athletes across the
country are afforded the same protections. Congress needs to yield
the power recognized by Justice Alito’s opinion in Murphy
252
and
introduce legislation for a nationwide ban on sports betting in
amateur sports. Student athletes present more risk and
vulnerabilities than their professional counterparts, and it is
therefore in the public interest to protect them accordingly.
253
CONCLUSION
College athletics provide a forum where young student athletes
can strive for excellence by displaying values that our educational
system has instilled in them, such as teamwork, self-sacrifice,
determination, humility, courage and sportsmanship. While the
practice of sports gambling in general has its detriments, the legal
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practice of gambling on collegiate sports presents a heightened risk
of problematic gambling that tarnishes the integrity of sports and
places unseemly influences on amateur athletes. In a time when
corruption and uncertainty seem to thrive, Congress must step in to
ensure a simple truth about America’s favorite pastime: that athletes
and fans alike deserve to know that fair competition and honesty still
exist in the game today.
